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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Should consumers have the right to sue their HMOs (health maintenance 
organizations) for the way they deliver medical care? 
In recent years, the federal courts have focused their attention upon, inter alia, 
the issue of whether HMOs have a duty to reveal financial incentive provisions 
contained in contracts between the HMO and plan physicians to plan members and 
beneficiaries under a health plan.  In fact, on June 12, 2000, the United States 
Supreme Court, in Pegram v. Herdrich,2 pondered whether HMO physicians and 
administrators are fiduciaries under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA)3, and if so, must they exercise their authority solely to benefit the interests 
of the patient? 
Moreover, both houses of Congress recently passed bills, that together, 
make up the BPPA of 2001.4  For either bill to become law, however, 
“depends largely on its ability to endure House-Senate conference 
committee discussions, as well as President George W. Bush’s staunch 
refusal to place his signature on a bill that would ultimately serve as a 
boon for trial lawyers.”5 
While the sponsors of the Senate bill appear to favor greater consumer protection, 
advocates in the House of Representatives are somewhat more restrained in their 
support of consumers’ rights.6  Perhaps it should come as no surprise that the less 
consumer oriented House bill is favored by President Bush, since it negates 
advantageous opportunities for trial lawyers.7 
At this juncture, it is expected that a conference committee will work to develop 
a compromise bill that can be sent to the President.8  Should this compromise bill 
become law, it will function as the long-awaited Patients’ Bill of Rights.9 
                                                                
2Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
329 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). 
4Urura W. Mayers, The Bipartisan Patient Protection Act: Greater Liability on Managed 
Care Plans, 12 Annals Health L. 341, 341 (Summer 2003); see also Bipartisan Patient 
Protection Act of 2001, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001); Bipartisan Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 
2563, 107th Cong. (2001). 
5Mayers, supra note 4, at 341. 
6Id.  
7Id. 
8Id. 
9Id. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
Historically, medical care in the U.S. has been delivered “on a fee-for-service 
basis:”10 
Under this type of arrangement, a patient makes a payment to the provider 
selected for the services provided.  Likewise, if the patient had insurance 
and the provider was willing, the provider submitted the patient's bill to 
the insurance plan for reimbursement subject to the terms of the insurance 
agreement.  Therefore, under a fee-for-service arrangement, a provider’s 
financial incentive is to provide more care, not less, so long as payment is 
forthcoming.  The check on this incentive is a provider’s obligation to 
exercise reasonable medical skill and judgment in the patient’s interest.  
Beginning in the late 1960’s, insurers and others developed new models 
for health-care delivery, including HMOs.  In turn, HMOs developed from 
managed care, theories of reducing costs and providing the best value for 
both the provider and the patient.  Generally, an HMO is any of a variety 
of types of health plans that contract with a defined group of providers 
(usually on a capitated basis) to provide health care to a defined 
population. 
Capitation involves providing a monthly payment per enrollee regardless 
of what care the individual actually receives.  The HMO thus assumes the 
financial risk of providing the benefits promised: if a participant or 
enrollee never gets sick, the HMO keeps the money regardless, and if a 
participant or enrollee becomes expensively ill, the HMO is responsible 
for the treatment agreed upon even if its cost exceeds the participant’s or 
enrollee’s premiums.11 
Accordingly, in an HMO system, less is more, so to speak, and “a [provider’s] 
financial interest lies in providing less care, not more.”12  However, covered services 
must be rendered with “a reasonable degree of skill and judgment in the patient's 
interest.”13 
Today, HMOs may function both as medical providers and insurers.14  Moreover, 
there are two general varieties of HMOs.15  “The first type, the staff model, hires 
providers directly to work out of its facilities.  The second type, the group model, 
contracts with provider groups to provide health care at discounted rates.”16 
                                                                
10Id. at 342. 
11Id. at 342-343. 
12Id. at 343. 
13Id.  
14Id. 
15Id. 
16Mayers, supra note 4, at 343. 
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In 1973, the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (“HMOA”) became 
law.17  In an effort to encourage the creation of HMOs, HMOA “offer[ed] loans and 
loan guarantees to those wishing to establish and operate federally qualified HMOs, 
and for grants for such things as the training of HMO administrators.”18 
Additionally, and perhaps more crucially, HMOA insulated HMOs from 
“restrictive state laws” by preempting them.19 
It bears noting that other “managed care entities” were created to serve as 
“substitutions to conventional systems of health care to reorganize risk assumption 
and medical decision-making.”20 
Two of the managed care models that evolved included preferred provider 
organizations (“PPOs”) and point-of-service (“POS”) plans.  PPOs are 
health plans that offer full or high coverage for a defined panel of 
providers (who accept discounted fees) and more limited coverage for 
care outside of the plan.  A POS, on the other hand, is a “hybrid plan with 
features of managed care and insurance, thereby making it a traditional 
HMO that also partially reimburses care received outside the plan.21 
In an effort to conserve resources, and thus, enhance their bottom line, HMOs 
and other managed care organizations (MCOs): 
primarily use two ways to encourage providers to engage in “cost-
conscious decision making.”  One way is through capitation.  The second 
way is by salary.  Salary exists when an HMO hires a group of providers 
as employees or contracts with a provider group, and each provider 
receives a salary for providing health care to a group of individuals in a 
particular health plan.  Both of these payment plans discourage providers 
from spending more time with their patients, because there is no 
additional compensation available for doing so.  Further, use of ancillary 
health care services like experimental treatments, diagnostic test, and 
referrals are not encouraged.  This is because there is often a certain 
amount of money set aside for these services, and anything remaining 
goes to the provider as a bonus.  These payment arrangements have, 
therefore, either directly or indirectly impacted providers’ decision-
making regarding their patients and their patients’ medical care needs.22 
III.  THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (“ERISA”) 
As noted above, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) was 
enacted into law by Congress in 1974.  ERISA was enacted primarily to protect 
employee pension funds from mismanagement and looting by administrators, for the 
                                                                
17Id. 
18Id. 
19Id. 
20Mayers, supra note 4, at 343. 
21Id. at 343-344. 
22Id. at 344. 
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ultimate protection of employees reliant upon such plans for retirement benefits.23  
Over time, ERISA has come to insulate most providers of employee benefits under 
employee benefit plans from lawsuits. 
ERISA imposes certain fiduciary responsibilities for the protection of employee 
benefit rights,24 and it has been held to preclude state law claims for the recovery of 
benefits or the enforcement or clarification of rights under an ERISA qualified health 
plan as well as preclude state law claims that “relate to” the statute under the 
statute’s preemption provisions.25 
IV.  “FIDUCIARY” AS DEFINED UNDER ERISA 
ERISA sets forth the circumstances under which a person is a fiduciary with 
respect to an employee benefit plan.26  The definition includes one who “exercises 
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting the management of 
such plan” and one who “has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of such plan.”27 
ERISA also imposes a duty upon plan fiduciaries to “discharge duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries,”28 and for 
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits and defraying reasonable expenses of 
administering the plan with the “care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent”29 person would use under similar 
circumstances. 
ERISA’s provision that fiduciaries shall discharge their duties with respect to a 
plan “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries”30 is rooted in the 
common law of agency, but an ERISA fiduciary may also have financial interests 
adverse to beneficiaries.  Thus, in every case charging breach of ERISA fiduciary 
duty, the threshold question is not whether the actions of some person providing 
services under the plan adversely affected a beneficiary’s interest, but whether that 
person was performing a fiduciary function when taking the complained of action.31 
V.  FEDERAL PREEMPTION UNDER ERISA 
ERISA imposes certain fiduciary responsibilities for the protection of employee 
benefit rights32 and has been held to preclude state law claims for the recovery of 
benefits or the enforcement or clarification of rights under an ERISA qualified health 
                                                                
23See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. 
2429 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1101-14. 
25Id. 
26§ 1002(21).   
27§§ 1002(21)(A)(i), (iii). 
28§ 1104(a)(1). 
29§ 1104(a)(1)(B). 
30§ 1104(a)(1). 
31Id. 
32§§ 1001, 1101-14. 
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plan as well as state law claims that “relate to” ERISA under the statute’s preemption 
provision.33  ERISA’s preemption provision is found at 29 U.S.C. § 1144, and it 
provides that ERISA supersedes state common law affecting employee benefits if the 
claims “relate to” the plan.34 
ERISA was enacted to protect the interests of participants in employee benefit 
plans and their beneficiaries by, among other things, “establishing standards of 
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and 
by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal 
Courts.”35  Its regulation “extends to [plans] that provide medical, surgical, or 
hospital care or benefits for plan participants or their beneficiaries through the 
purchase of insurance or otherwise.”36 
Recognizing “the reservation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate 
the field of employee benefit plans as ERISA’s crowning achievement,”37 the 
legislation's sponsors “emphasized both the breadth and importance of the 
preemption provisions [to] establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal 
concern.”38  Thus, § 514(a) of ERISA provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and 
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan.”39  This “broad” and “expansive” preemption clause40 thus provides a federal 
law defense to all common law causes of action that “relate to” an employee benefit 
plan, unless ERISA expressly excepts the cause of action from ERISA’s preemption 
provision.41 
Having preempted a field defined by claims relating to an ERISA plan, ERISA 
precludes the prosecution of preempted state-law claims that are not otherwise saved 
from preemption under § 514(b)(2)(A) unless they fall within the scope of the 
exclusive civil enforcement mechanism provided by § 502(a) of ERISA,42 in which 
case they must be treated as federal causes of action under § 502(a).43  Section 502(a) 
authorizes participants or beneficiaries to file civil actions, among other things, to 
recover benefits, to enforce rights conferred by an ERISA plan, to remedy breaches 
of fiduciary duty, to clarify rights to benefits, and to enjoin violations of ERISA.44  
                                                                
33See generally Miller v. HealthAmerica Pennsylvania Inc., 50 Pa. D. & C.4th 1 (Ct. Com. 
Pl. 2000). 
3429 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
3529 U.S.C. § 1001(b). 
36New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 650-51, (1995) (quoting ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)). 
37Id. 
38Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987). 
3929 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
40Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46. 
41Id. at 48. 
4229 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
43Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). 
4429 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
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Thus, if a state law claim preempted by § 514 is not included within the scope of § 
502(a), the claim is susceptible to a § 514 defense, whether it is brought in state or 
federal court.45  However, if a state law claim falls within the scope of § 502(a), it is 
“completely preempted” and therefore treated as a federal cause of action.46 
Stated otherwise, under the scheme established by Congress, ERISA § 514 
preempts a field defined by claims relating to employee benefit plans regulated by 
ERISA that are not otherwise subject to ERISA’s saving clause and, once having 
occupied that field, limits civil enforcement to claims provided in § 502(a).47  Any 
claim falling within the field but not within the scope of § 502(a) is preempted and 
must be dismissed, and any claim falling within the scope of § 502(a) becomes 
exclusively a federal cause of action.48  Thus, simple preemption under § 514 
precludes prosecution of the preempted state law claim, but “complete preemption” 
exists when the preempted state law claim falls within the scope of the exclusive 
civil enforcement mechanism of § 502, in which case the state law claim is converted 
into a federal cause of action removable to federal Court.49 
Because a state law claim that is completely preempted under § 502(a) becomes a 
federal cause of action, it may be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
and 1441 even if it is pleaded only as a state law claim.  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Metropolitan Life, “[f]ederal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal defense 
to the plaintiff’s suit”.50  As a defense, it does not appear on the face of a well-
pleaded complaint, and, therefore, does not authorize removal to a federal court.51 
One corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule developed in the case law, 
however, is that Congress may so completely preempt a particular area that any civil 
complaint raising this select group of claims [within the scope of § 502(a)] is 
necessarily federal in character.52 
VI.  THE FIDUCIARY STATUS OF AN HMO UNDER ERISA PRE-PEGRAM 
Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Pegram, three of the 
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal-the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth-heard cases and 
rendered decisions regarding whether or not HMOs are fiduciaries under ERISA, and 
thus, subject to liability as such. 
                                                                
45Id. 
46See Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 66-67. 
4729 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
48Id. 
49Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 66-67; see also In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 
160 (3d Cir. 1999) (“It is important to distinguish complete preemption under § 502(a) of 
ERISA, which is used in this sense as a jurisdictional concept, from express preemption under 
§ 514(a) of ERISA, which is a substantive concept governing the applicable law”); Warner v. 
Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Removal and preemption are two distinct 
concepts”). 
50Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63. 
51Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936). 
52Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63. 
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A.  The Fifth Circuit’s Approach 
In Ehlmann v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,53 the plaintiff HMO plan 
members, seeking class certification, alleged that the defendant HMO as ERISA 
fiduciaries had a duty to disclose financial incentive arrangements with plan 
doctors.54  Prior to reaching the class certification issue, the District Court dismissed 
the action for failure to state a claim, “finding that since ERISA imposed no such 
duty, Ehlmann could prove no set of facts in which that duty was breached.55 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on the ground that “ERISA nowhere 
contains any specific reference to a duty to disclose physician compensation plans.”56 
The Fifth Circuit refused to interpret ERISA in a broad fashion, opting to defer to the 
authority of Congress and the strict language of the statute.57  The Court also 
declined to imply a duty to disclose from the general language of ERISA, since the 
statute has a number of disclosure provisions, none of which require the disclosure of 
physician incentive plans.58 
Remedy Sought 
Amongst other things, the plaintiff sought an injunction requiring that the 
defendant “modify its member handbook and/or physicians directories to fully 
disclose to all plan members the bonus arrangements between the HMO and their 
contracting physicians.”59 
B.  The Seventh Circuit’s Approach 
In Herdrich v. Pegram,60 the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s fiduciary 
count for failure to state a claim.61 
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the action for trial on the fiduciary 
issue.62  Citing ERISA’s conflict preemption provisions, the Court held that: 
[i]n order to properly state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under 
ERISA, the plaintiff’s complaint must allege facts which set forth: 
1. that the defendants are plan fiduciaries; 
                                                                
53Ehlmann v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 198 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000). 
54Id. at 554. 
55Id. 
56Id. at 555. 
57Id. 
58Id. at 555-556. 
59Id. at 554 
60Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), reh’g en banc, 170 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 
1999), cert. granted, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
61Id. at 367. 
62Id. at 380. 
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2. that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties; and 
3. that a cognizable loss resulted.63 
The Circuit Court, in noting that Congress intended the definition of fiduciary be 
broadly construed under ERISA, found that the defendant was an ERISA fiduciary.64  
The Court also found that the HMO’s failure to disclose its physician incentive 
scheme was tainted with self-interest.65  As for cognizable loss, the Court notes that 
since the plan was deprived of funds due to the incentive plan in question, loss was, 
in fact, suffered.66  The 7th Circuit remanded the case to District Court for a trial on 
the fiduciary duty issue.67 
Remedy Sought 
The plaintiff in Herdrich sought a prohibition against the alleged drainage of 
funds from the plan through enforcement of ERISA’s fiduciary provisions.68  Prior to 
the appeal, the plaintiff had received a $35,000 verdict arising out of Dr. Pegram’s 
medical malpractice.69 
C.  The Eighth Circuit’s Approach 
In Esensten v. Shea,70 the District Court dismissed the action for failure to state a 
claim on the ground that ERISA does not require disclosure of doctor compensation 
agreements since they are not “material facts affecting a beneficiary’s interests.”71  
The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the HMO had a duty to disclose its 
“referral-discouraging approach to health care.”72  The Eighth Circuit noted that the 
HMO in question was a fiduciary under ERISA and must comply with the common 
law duty of loyalty, which includes the obligation to deal fairly and honestly with all 
plan members.73 
Contrary to the District Court, the Eighth Circuit found that the financial 
incentive plan in question was a material piece of information to the patient, and that 
the duty of loyalty requires an ERISA fiduciary to communicate any material facts 
                                                                
63Id. at 369. 
64Id. at 370. 
65Id. at 371. 
66Id. 
67Id. 
68Id. at 367. 
69Id. 
70Esensten v. Shea, 107 F.3d 625, cert denied, 522 U.S. 914, (1997), aff’d on reh’g, 208 
F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000). 
71Id. at 627; see also Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228. 
72Id. at 628. 
73Id. at 628-629. 
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which could adversely affect a plan member’s interests.74  The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.75 
Remedy Sought 
While the remedy issue was not reached by the Court in Esensten, counsel for the 
plaintiff sought the value of the care her decedent spouse should have received.  
Additionally, plaintiff sought equitable relief, namely restitution to be paid to the 
HMO plan members from that portion of the HMOs profits which went toward 
unjustly enriching the administrator-physicians.76 
VII.  THE SUPREME COURT RECTIFIES A CIRCUIT SPLIT: PEGRAM V. HERDRICH77 
A.  The Facts 
In Pegram v. Herdrich, the Petitioner was an HMO owned by physicians 
providing prepaid medical services to participants whose employers contract with 
Carle for coverage.78 Respondent Herdrich “was covered by Carle through her 
husband’s employer, State Farm Insurance Company.”  After petitioner Pegram, a 
Carle physician, required Herdrich to wait eight days for an ultrasound of her 
inflamed abdomen, Herdrich’s appendix ruptured, causing peritonitis.  She sued 
Carle in state Court for, fraud, inter alia.79 
Carle responded that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) preempted the fraud counts and removed the case to federal court.80 
The District Court granted Carle summary judgment on one fraud count but 
granted Herdrich leave to amend the other.81  Her amended count alleged that the 
provision of medical services under terms rewarding “physician owners for limiting 
medical care entailed an inherent or anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary 
duty,” since the terms created an incentive to make decisions in the physicians’ self-
interest, rather than the plan participants’ exclusive interests.82 
The District Court granted Carle’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Carle 
was not acting as an ERISA fiduciary.83  The Seventh Circuit reversed the 
dismissal.84 
                                                                
74Id. at 629. 
75Esensten v. Shea, 531 U.S. 871 (2000). 
76Esensten, 208 F.3d at 716. 
77Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
78Id. at 215. 
79Id. 
80Id. 
81Id. at 216. 
82Id. 
83Id. at 217. 
84Id. at 217-18. 
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B.  The Issue Presented 
The question presented in Pegram was “whether treatment decisions made by 
a[n] [HMO], acting through its physician employees, are fiduciary acts within the 
meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).”85  
Despite the significance of Pegram to post-Pegram HMO liability preemption cases 
under ERISA, infra, the issue of federal preemption, pursuant to ERISA, was not 
addressed by the Pegram Court. 
C.  The Court’s Holding 
The United States Supreme Court held that because mixed treatment and 
eligibility decisions by HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA, 
Herdrich did not state an ERISA claim.86 
D.  The Court’s Rationale 
Herdrich sought relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), which provides that: 
any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of 
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this 
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses 
to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan 
any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets 
of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or 
remedial relief as the Court may deem appropriate, including removal of 
such fiduciary.87 
According to the Court, Congress did not intend an HMO “to be treated as a 
fiduciary to the extent that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting through its 
physicians,”88 and, in fact, Congress is unlikely to have thought of such decisions as 
fiduciary.89  The common law trustee’s most defining concern is the payment of 
money in the beneficiary’s interest, and mixed eligibility decisions have only a 
limited resemblance to that concern.90  Consideration of the consequences of 
Herdrich’s contrary view leaves no doubt as to Congress’s intent.91  Recovery against 
for-profit HMOs for their mixed decisions “would be warranted simply upon a 
showing that the profit incentive to ration care would generally affect [such] 
decisions, in derogation of the fiduciary standard to act [in the patient’s interest] 
without possibility of conflict.”92  And since the provision for profits is what makes a 
for-profit HMO a proprietary organization, Herdrich’s remedy – return of profit to 
                                                                
85Id. at 214. 
86Id. at 237. 
8729 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
88Pegram, 530 U.S. 231. 
89Id. 
90Id. 
91Id. at 232. 
92Id. at 232-33. 
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the plan for the participants’ benefit – “would be nothing less than elimination of the 
for-profit HMO.  [T]he Judiciary has no warrant to precipitate the upheaval that 
would follow a refusal to dismiss Herdrich’s . . . claim.”93 
The Court, in shielding HMOs from such “breach of fiduciary obligation” causes 
of action under ERISA, acknowledged that Congress, which has promoted the 
formation of HMOs for 27 years, may choose to restrict its approval to certain 
preferred forms, “[b]ut the . . . Judiciary would be acting contrary to . . . 
congressional policy . . . if it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim portending 
wholesale attacks on existing HMOs solely because of their structure.”94 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the Seventh Circuit’s attempt to limit fiduciary 
breach cases to instances in which the sole purpose of delaying or withholding 
treatment is to increase the physician’s financial reward, would also lead to fatal 
difficulties.95  The HMO’s defense would be that its physician acted for good 
medical reasons.96  For all practical purposes, every claim would boil down to a 
malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard would be nothing but the traditional 
medical malpractice standard.97  The only value to plan participants of such an 
ERISA fiduciary action would be eligibility for attorney’s fees if they won.98  A 
physician “would [also] be subject to suit in federal Court applying an ERISA 
standard of reasonable medical skill.”99  This would, in turn, seem to preempt a state 
malpractice claim, even though ERISA does not preempt such claims absent a clear 
manifestation of congressional purpose.100 
E.  Justice Souter’s Footnote 
Justice Souter, at footnote 8, leaves the door open to the imposition of liability 
upon an HMO.101  More specifically, Souter notes that an HMO may be considered a 
fiduciary under ERISA, “insofar as it has discretionary authority to administer the 
plan, and so it is obligated to disclose characteristics of the plan and those who 
provide services to the plan, if that information affects beneficiaries’ material 
interests.”102 
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VIII.  THE IMPACT OF PEGRAM 
A.  Miller v.HealthAmerica Pennsylvania Inc.103 
“What is a ‘mixed eligibility decision,’ and what is the significance (as to ERISA 
preemption) that such is not a (fiduciary) decision?”104  These questions were 
addressed in Miller v. HealthAmerica Pennsylvania Inc. 
The Miller Court dissected the holding in Pegram, and in so doing, it analyzed a 
number of matters important for any Court addressing ERISA preemption issues as 
they relate to the acts of an HMO.105  According to the Court: 
the Supreme Court took up the matter of an HMO playing various roles: 
sometimes making medical treatment decisions and sometimes making 
administrative decisions.  That discussion arose in the following context.  
Ms. Herdrich claimed that the HMO breached a fiduciary duty in making 
certain decisions.  Under ERISA, in order for a person to be considered a 
fiduciary, he or she “must be someone acting in the capacity of manager, 
administrator, or financial adviser” to a plan. (citation omitted).  The 
statute “defines an administrator, for example, as a fiduciary only ‘to the 
extent’ that he acts in such a capacity in relation to the plan.” (citation 
omitted).  Thus, it was important for the Supreme Court to determine 
whether the acts in question by the HMO were administrative: because, if 
so, the HMO was acting as a fiduciary at that time.  It was in this context, 
then, that the Court discussed the various sorts of decisions that an HMO 
may make, and whether such decisions are “administrative” acts within 
the meaning of ERISA.106 
The Miller court further commented that “[t]he Supreme Court acknowledged 
that an HMO will sometimes make “pure” eligibility decisions (which are clearly 
administrative decisions) and sometimes pure medical treatment decisions (which are 
not administrative).  The Court expanded this concept in a new way, however, by 
pointing out that, in many cases, these decisions are “practically inextricable from 
one another.”107 
The court went on to state that: 
Eligibility decisions cannot be untangled from physicians’ judgments 
about reasonable medical treatment.108  The Supreme Court concluded that 
in the case before it: [the HMO physician’s] decision was one of that sort.  
She [the HMO physician] decided (wrongly, as it turned out) that 
Herdrich’s condition did not warrant immediate action; the consequence 
of that medical determination was that [the HMO] would not cover 
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immediate care, whereas it would have done so if Dr. Pegram [the HMO 
physician] had made the proper diagnosis and judgment to treat.  The 
eligibility decision [that Ms. Herdrich was not covered for the diagnostic 
test at the local hospital] and the treatment decision [that Ms. Herdrich did 
not require immediate medical attention] were inextricably mixed, as they 
are in countless medical administrative decisions every day.109 
Next, the Miller court noted that the Supreme Court “distinguished such ‘mixed’ 
eligibility decisions from ‘pure’ eligibility decisions ‘such as whether a plan covers 
an undisputed case of appendicitis.’”110  These “pure” eligibility decisions are 
“administrative” for purposes of ERISA.  Where, however, there is an element of 
medical judgment involved, such decisions by an HMO are not made in an 
administrative capacity, and therefore not in a fiduciary capacity.111 
In an effort to clarify the Supreme Court’s concept of “mixed eligibility 
determinations,” the Miller court examined the following hypothetical: 
assume that an ERISA plan provides that a plan participant is covered for 
treatment received at a hospital outside the HMO network only where 
such treatment is for emergency care.  In Pegram, the Supreme Court 
pointed out that “an HMO’s refusal to pay for emergency care on the 
ground that the situation giving rise to the need for care was not an 
emergency” is just such a mixed determination.  Such an eligibility 
determination, mixed as it is with medical judgment, does not constitute 
“administering” the plan, and is therefore not made by the HMO in a 
fiduciary capacity. 
The significance of this analysis toward ERISA preemption analysis now 
becomes apparent.  In both circumstances, the key inquiry is whether the 
decisions under consideration were made by the HMO in its capacity as 
“administrator” to the plan. In the Pegram case before the United States 
Supreme Court, such a finding would lead to the conclusion that the HMO 
was acting as a fiduciary with regard to that particular decision.  In ERISA 
preemption cases, such a finding would lead to the conclusion that the 
claim is preempted under section 514 of ERISA.  Accordingly, because 
the United States Supreme Court has concluded that such mixed eligibility 
decisions are not administrative acts under ERISA, a state Court tort claim 
against an HMO based upon such a mixed eligibility decision would 
likewise not be preempted by ERISA.  The net effect of all of this, of 
course, is to reduce the opportunity for preemption.  A decision by an 
HMO that might otherwise be thought to be administrative (and therefore 
give rise to preemption) is deemed not to be so where it is mixed with 
medical judgment. 
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In fact, the “emergency care” example used by the United States Supreme 
Court in Pegram not only illustrates that concept well, it also parallels the 
factual pattern before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pappas.  In 
Pappas, as set forth above, plan participants were generally required under 
the plan to receive their medical care only from doctors and hospitals 
within the HMO network-i.e., from doctors and hospitals having contracts 
with the HMO.  Emergency care, however, was an exception.  In an 
emergency, participants were covered under the plan no matter where they 
received their medical care.  In the Pappas case, as noted above, the 
emergency room physician determined that the situation before him was a 
neurological emergency.  The physician requested the HMO, therefore, to 
approve Mr. Pappas’s transfer to Jefferson Hospital, a facility outside the 
HMO network, but equipped and ready to treat Mr. Pappas.  The HMO 
refused this request for authorization. 
Such an eligibility determination by the HMO (that, under the plan, Mr. 
Pappas was not eligible for treatment at Jefferson) is clearly premised 
upon a medical determination (that Mr. Pappas’s condition did not 
warrant emergency care).  The United States Supreme Court concluded in 
Pegram that such a mixed determination does not involve the 
“administration” of a benefit plan.  It follows that a state Court medical 
malpractice claim challenging this mixed determination is not expressly 
preempted under section 514 of ERISA.  Accordingly, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s holding in Pappas is still good law.112 
Such a conclusion is also suggested by another section of the United States 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Pegram.113  In discussing the practical consequences of 
allowing mixed eligibility decisions by an HMO to form the basis of a fiduciary 
claim under ERISA, the Court concluded that such a claim would simply duplicate 
remedies already available in a state court malpractice action: 
Thus, for all practical purposes, every claim of fiduciary breach by an 
HMO physician making a mixed decision would boil down to a 
malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard would be nothing but the 
malpractice standard traditionally applied in actions against physicians. 
What would be the value to the plan participant of having this kind of 
ERISA fiduciary action?  It would simply apply the law already available 
in the state Court.114 
In short, the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged that, in 
connection with certain claims against an HMO (such as those made in Pappas), a 
state Court remedy is “already available.”115  However, “such a remedy is (available), 
in state court, of course, only if it is not subject to preemption by ERISA.”116  The 
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logical conclusion, then, is that the Supreme Court does not intend such “mixed” 
claims against an HMO to be preempted by ERISA.117 
B.  The Second Circuit’s First Look Post-Pegram: Cicio v. Does118 
Cicio v. Does was the first case in the Second Circuit, subsequent to Pegram, to 
consider whether ERISA preempted medical malpractice claims.119  The Cicio case 
involved a claim in which an HMO denied a patient, who had been diagnosed with 
multiple myeloma, a treatment involving high dose chemotherapy, as well as 
peripheral blood stem cell transplantation in a tandem double transplant.  The 
medical director of the HMO denied the treating physician’s request to authorize this 
treatment on the ground that it was an “experimental/investigatory procedure” not 
covered by the plan.120  In response to the treating physician's request for 
reconsideration, the medical director replied that “[b]ased on the clinical peer review 
of the additional material, a single stem cell transplant has been approved [but] the 
original request for tandem stem cell transplant remains denied.”121 
The court dismissed the plaintiff's malpractice claim on the ground that it was 
preempted by ERISA.  In so doing, the Second Circuit concluded that “a state law 
malpractice action, if based on a ‘mixed eligibility and treatment decision,’ is not 
subject to ERISA preemption when that state law cause of action challenges an 
allegedly flawed medical judgment as applied to a particular patient's symptoms.”122 
C.  Drawing Distinctions:  Rubin-Schneiderman v. Merit Behavioral Care Corp.123 
In Rubin-Schneiderman v. Merit Behavioral Care Corp., 
[p]laintiff brought a state court action against Empire Blue Cross, Merit, 
and Dr. Ahluwalia based on Merit's refusal to authorize coverage for in-
patient care for plaintiff's psychiatric illness.  The plaintiff claim[ed] that 
Merit and Dr. Ahluwalia were negligent in refusing coverage, and that 
Empire Blue Cross [was] vicariously liable for their acts.  The plaintiff 
also charged both Merit and Empire Blue Cross with negligent hiring, 
training, and supervision.”124   
Following removal of the action to federal court, the plaintiff moved to remand 
the matter back to state court.125  The motion to remand was denied by the District 
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Court on the grounds that the plaintiff’s cause of action had been preempted by 
ERISA.126  
The District Court noted that “[i]n attempting to define the scope of claims 
subject to complete preemption, Courts have drawn a distinction between claims that 
relate to plan administration, which are completely preempted, and claims for 
medical malpractice, which remain governed by state law.”127  The rationale behind 
this distinction lies in the fact “that malpractice claims involve individual cases of 
negligence for which ERISA provides no standards of review, and in which lack of 
uniformity does not subvert Congress’s purpose in regulating employer insurance 
plans.”128 
Ultimately, the plaintiff was unsuccessful in arguing that his claim should not be 
subject to complete preemption, since such claims should be construed as claims for 
negligence in providing medical treatment, as opposed to claims for the recovery of a 
benefit under the plan.129 
In denying the plaintiff’s remand request, the court acknowledged that 
prospective utilization review (“UR”) is a cost-containment mechanism commonly 
used by medical insurance providers.  It further acknowledged that Merit’s job in 
performing UR for Empire Blue Cross was to determine whether plaintiff's requested 
mental health treatment would be covered by plaintiff's policy.130 
The plaintiff maintained that, by concluding that in-patient treatment was not 
medically necessary, “Merit exercised medical judgment and essentially dictated the 
course of plaintiff's treatment.  Plaintiff reasoned that his negligence claims did not 
involve enforcement of plan benefits per se, but rather related to the quality of 
medical care he received.”131 
In denying the plaintiff relief, the District Court recognized that other courts have 
rejected claims such as the plaintiff's on numerous occasions and concluded that 
decisions by UR agents to disapprove requested treatment relate to administration of 
plan benefits, not to provisions of medical care.132  In so doing, the Court recognized 
that claims for negligence in improperly failing to approve treatment more closely 
resemble claims for denial of a plan benefit than claims for medical malpractice.133 
The plaintiff further sought to overcome the weight of this authority by extending 
the reasoning of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pegram.  In Pegram, the 
Court held that mixed eligibility/treatment decisions by HMOs and their physicians 
are not fiduciary decisions giving rise to a claim under ERISA.134 
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Although the issue of preemption was not before it, the Pegram Court expressed 
the concern that allowing preemption of claims relating to determinations about 
medical necessity would necessarily federalize malpractice litigation.135  The Court 
also justified its finding on the basis that the health plan, a fee-for-service based plan, 
was not a covered plan under ERISA.136 
Ultimately, the Southern District, in a subsequent decision,137 granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the action on the grounds of preemption.138  
Thereafter, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals139 ordered the District Court to 
reconsider its dismissal of the underlying action in light of its decision in Cicio140  
Despite so reconsidering, the District Court adhered to its prior decision.141 
D.  The Third Circuit Has a Look at HMO Liability Under ERISA Post-Pegram: 
Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hospital142 
The Third Circuit had an opportunity to examine the Pegram decision in Lazorko 
v. Pennsylvania Hospital.  The decedent, Patricia Norlie-Lazorko, 
committed suicide in July 1993, allegedly as a consequence of her 
untreated mental illness.  Her husband, Jonathan Lazorko, brought suit in 
state Court against Dr. David Nicklin, Patricia’s doctor; University City 
Family Medicine, Nicklin's employer; Pennsylvania Hospital; the Institute 
of Pennsylvania; and U.S. Healthcare, Inc., the health maintenance 
organization (HMO) administering Lazorko's health benefits.  After a 
series of removals of the case to the U.S. District Court and remands to 
state Court, Lazorko appeals the dismissal of his direct claims against 
U.S. Healthcare and the District Court’s award of sanctions against him 
for including two purportedly frivolous allegations in his complaint.  U.S. 
Healthcare cross-appeals the District Court's remand to state Court of the 
vicarious liability claims against it.143 
The Lazorko court, following the Third Circuit’s pre-Pegram decision in In re 
U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,144 affirmed the remand to state court of the vicarious liability 
claims against U.S. Healthcare.  However, it reversed the judgment of the district 
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court, dismissing the direct claims against U.S. Healthcare (Count I of the 
Complaint), and remanded these claims to the District Court for remand to the state 
court.145 
In examining the District Court’s prior decision, the Third Circuit focused its 
attention on the scope of § 514(a).146  The court maintained that its intervening 
decision in In re U.S. Healthcare147 convinced it that plaintiff’s direct claims against 
U.S. Healthcare are not completely preempted.148  Of significance to the court was 
the fact that these direct claims “challenged the soundness of a medical decision by a 
health care provider rather than the administration of benefits under an ERISA 
plan.”149  Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiff was not seeking a 
remedy for “the administrative denial of a benefit under § 502(a)(1)(B).  For that 
reason, the removal of Lazorko's action to the federal court on the basis of complete 
preemption was improper.”150 
The Lazorko court went on to hold that such a conclusion adhered to its holding 
in In re U.S. Healthcare,151 where the plaintiffs, like the plaintiff in Lazorko, 
“challenged U.S. Healthcare's financial incentive structure.  They claimed it 
contributed to their newborn daughter's death because she was prematurely 
discharged from the hospital in order that the hospital might avoid monetary 
penalties. Thus, the infant was denied essential post-natal care.”152 
Moreover, the Third Circuit noted that the plaintiffs brought their suit against the 
HMO in New Jersey state court, “alleging a variety of state law claims aimed at the 
influence which U.S. Healthcare's financial incentive system had on medical 
decisions.”153  The court noted that “[a]s in the case before us, U.S. Healthcare 
removed the case to federal court, claiming that the failure to provide adequate post-
natal care constituted a denial of benefits that was completely preempted by 
ERISA.”154 
Relying upon its additional pre-Pegram precedent, Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc.,155 the court in Lazorko notes: 
the refusal to offer additional care, whether couched in terms of direct or 
vicarious liability, could be a question of the quality of care provided. As 
such, it did not amount to a claim that benefits to which the plaintiffs were 
otherwise entitled had been denied by U.S. Healthcare when 
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administering a plan.  Instead, the claim concerned decisions of treatment 
that were akin to claims for medical malpractice.156  We had concluded in 
Dukes that a claim for vicarious liability against an HMO for a doctor’s 
malpractice fell outside the scope of ERISA’s complete preemption 
clause.  In In re U.S. Healthcare, we extended that ruling to encompass 
claims that an HMO was directly liable for arranging inadequate care.  In 
doing so, we reasoned that financial incentives that discouraged care did 
not deny plan benefits, but instead, affected the quality of the care 
provided. (citation omitted).  Thus, we held that decisions to deny a 
particular request in the course of providing treatment could be a claim 
about the quality — and not the quantity — of benefits provided. In all but 
the details, Lazorko’s claims against U.S. Healthcare fall squarely within 
this rubric.  On appeal, Lazorko argues that his liability claims amount to 
ones of quality because U.S. Healthcare implicitly caused Dr. Nicklin to 
misdiagnose and/or mistreat the severity of Ms. Norlie-Lazorko’s illness.  
Thus, such a claim does not fall within the complete preemption scope of 
§ 502(a)(1)(B).157 
E.  Pappas v. Asbel158 
The facts involved in Pappas were as follows: 
On May 21, 1991, Basile Pappas (“Pappas”) was admitted to Haverford 
Community Hospital (“Haverford”) through its emergency room 
complaining of paralysis and numbness in his extremities.  At the time of 
his admission, Pappas was an insured of HMO-PA, a health maintenance 
organization operated by U.S. Healthcare. 
Dr. Stephen Dickter, the emergency room physician, concluded that 
Pappas was suffering from an epidural abscess which was pressing on 
Pappas’ spinal column.  Dr. Dickter consulted with a neurologist and a 
neurosurgeon; the physicians concurred that Pappas’ condition constituted 
a neurological emergency.  Given the circumstances, Dr. Dickter felt that 
it was in Pappas’ best interests to receive treatment at a university 
hospital. 
Dr. Dickter made arrangements to transfer Pappas to Jefferson University 
Hospital (“Jefferson”) for further treatment.  At approximately 12:40 p.m. 
when the ambulance arrived, Dr. Dickter was alerted to the fact that U.S. 
Healthcare was denying authorization for treatment at Jefferson.  Ten 
minutes later, Dr. Dickter contacted U.S. Healthcare to obtain 
authorization for the transfer to Jefferson.  At 1:[05]p.m., U.S. Healthcare 
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responded to Dr. Dickter’s inquiry and advised him that authorization for 
treatment at Jefferson was still being denied, but that Pappas could be 
transferred to either Hahnemann University (“Hahnemann”), Temple 
University or Medical College of Pennsylvania (“MCP”). 
Dr. Dickter immediately contacted Hahnemann.  That facility advised 
Haverford at approximately 2:20 p.m. that it would not have information 
on its ability to receive Pappas for at least another half hour.  MCP was 
then reached and within minutes it agreed to accept Pappas; Pappas was 
ultimately transported there at 3:30 p.m.  Pappas now suffers from 
permanent quadriplegia resulting from compression of his spine by the 
abscess.159 
Plaintiff filed suit against his primary care physician, as well as the above 
hospital.  He alleged that the physician had committed medical malpractice and that 
the hospital was negligent in causing “an inordinate delay in transferring him to a 
facility equipped and immediately available to handle his neurological 
emergency.”160 
A subsequent third party action was commenced against U.S. Healthcare, which 
claimed that U.S. Health Care’s liability hinged upon its failure and “refusal to 
authorize the plaintiff’s transfer to a hospital selected by the Haverford physicians.”  
In addition, the primary care physician asserted cross-claims against U.S. Healthcare 
seeking contribution and indemnity.161 
Thereafter, U.S. Healthcare brought a motion for summary judgment with respect 
to the third party action, and maintained “that the third party claims are preempted by 
§ 1144(a) of ERISA.”162  While the lower court granted the motion, the superior 
court on appeal “determined that ERISA did not preempt the state law claims.163  
This Court subsequently granted U.S. Healthcare’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal 
in order to determine whether these third party claims fall within the scope of those 
state actions which are preempted by ERISA.”164 
Pursuant to the U.S. Healthcare Plan at issue, plan participants were generally 
required to receive their medical care only from doctors and hospitals within the 
HMO network, that is, from doctors and hospitals having contracts with the HMO.  
Emergency care, however, was an exception.  In an emergency, participants were 
covered under the plan no matter where they received their medical care.165 
In the Pappas case, as noted above, the emergency room physician determined 
that the situation before him was a neurological emergency.  The physician requested 
the HMO, therefore, to approve Mr. Pappas transfer to Jefferson Hospital, a facility 
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outside the HMO network, but equipped and ready to treat Mr. Pappas.  The HMO 
refused this request for authorization.166 
Upon remand, pursuant to the direction of The United States Supreme 
Court, the Pappas court concluded that the HMO’s refusal to permit 
referral to non-network hospitals was a “mixed eligibility and treatment 
decision” best addressed by state medical malpractice laws, and further, 
that ERISA did not preempt the claim against the HMO.167 
F.  One Court’s Refusal to Apply the Principles Set Forth in  
Pegram: Rosenkrans v. Wetzel168 
In Rosenkrans, the “plaintiffs brought a state Court action against, inter alia, a 
medical center and health plan, seeking damages for patient’s death allegedly 
resulting from defendants’ tortious and negligent conduct.”169  The health plan 
sought removal to federal court on the grounds of federal preemption, while  the 
plaintiffs made a motion to remand the matter to state court.  The District Court 
maintained that the plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim “was not subject to 
complete preemption, necessitating remand.”170  The basis for the court’s holding 
was that the medical malpractice claim asserted against health plan was based upon 
alleged delivery of poor quality health care, and, thus, it fell outside scope of 
ERISA’s civil enforcement provision and was not subject to complete preemption.171 
Interestingly, the Court distinguished the matter before it from Pegram, which 
was relied upon by one of the defendants in the action.  According to the Court: 
We find that reliance, however, is misplaced and does not justify 
Defendant’s argument. 
In Pegram the Plaintiff, Herdrich, instituted a lawsuit in State Court for 
medical malpractice and subsequently added two counts charging state-
law fraud.  Several of the Defendants responded that ERISA preempted 
the new counts and removed the case to Federal Court.  After certain 
proceedings in the Federal Court, Plaintiff was allowed to amend the 
complaint and she did so by alleging that the “provision of medical 
services under the terms of the Carle HMO Organization rewarding its 
physician owners for limiting medical care, entailed an inherent or 
anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty. 
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There was no contest in the Pegram case concerning the propriety of the 
removal of the matter from State to Federal Court and the Supreme Court 
took no position on whether the case was properly removed. 
The question which the Supreme Court addressed in the Pegram case was 
“whether treatment decisions made by a health maintenance organization, 
acting through its physician employees, are fiduciary acts within the 
meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) (citation omitted).  The Supreme Court held that such conduct 
did not amount to “fiduciary acts within the meaning of ERISA.” 
This is a different question than the one we face in the matter before us.  
The Complaint in this case is a straightforward medical malpractice 
action.  All of the authorities we have cited herein instruct that such 
actions are not completely preempted and should be remanded to the State 
Court. 
The Defendant would have us extend some of the commentary in the 
Pegram case and conclude that the commentary indicates the Supreme 
Court is moving in a direction which would find the preemption doctrine 
applies to a case such we consider in this opinion.  We find no reason to 
accept the invitation to find within the Pegram case any indication of such 
a directional movement.  Rather, we find the Pegram is confined to its 
own particular factual background and it provides us with no authority to 
accept the Defendant’s argument.172 
G.  Pryzbowksi v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.173 
In Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.: 
[t]he beneficiary of an employee benefit plan brought state Court action 
against an HMO, the beneficiary’s primary health-care provider, and the 
provider’s physicians, alleging injury from delays in approving requested 
referrals, and asserting claims for negligence and other torts.  The HMO 
removed action.  The United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey dismissed the claim against the HMO and granted summary 
judgment in favor of the remaining defendants, all on the grounds of 
preemption by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  The 
beneficiary appealed.  The Court of Appeals, held that: (1) the state law 
claims against the HMO were completely preempted under ERISA’s civil 
enforcement provision; (2) the District Court had discretion to exercise 
pendent jurisdiction over the claims against the provider and physicians 
after the dismissal of the claims against the HMO; and (3) the negligence 
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claims against the provider and the physicians were not preempted under 
ERISA’s express preemption provision.174 
One of the “benefits” that HMOs provide is the doctors who render the medical 
services.  Thus, claims of malpractice against HMOs arising from denial of 
authorization for treatment readily implicate the quality of care received by the 
patient, and courts rely on the fact that the HMO was acting as “medical provider” 
rather than “administrator” in finding that negligence claims are not completely 
preempted.175 
According to the Pryzbowski Court: 
Pegram suggests preferable terminology.  Although that case concerned 
fiduciary acts under ERISA and not preemption, the distinction made 
there between “eligibility decisions,” which “turn on the plan’s coverage 
of a particular condition or medical procedure for its treatment,” and 
“treatment decisions,” which are choices in “diagnosing and treating a 
patent's [sic] condition,” is equally applicable for complete preemption 
analysis.  Regardless of the language used, the ultimate distinction to 
make for purposes of complete preemption is whether the claim 
challenges the administration of or eligibility for benefits, which falls 
within the scope of § 502(a) and is completely preempted, or the quality 
of the medical treatment performed, which may be the subject of a state 
action.176 
The court further noted that it had not: 
had occasion to consider how a claim that the HMO or plan administrator 
delayed in the approval of benefits should be treated under ERISA.  It is 
evident that a claim alleging that a physician knowingly delayed in 
performing urgent surgery on a patient whose appendix was about to 
rupture would relate to the quality of care, and not be subject to removal 
on the basis of complete preemption.  On the other hand, a claim alleging 
that an HMO declined to approve certain requested medical services or 
treatment on the ground that they were not covered under the plan would 
manifestly be one regarding the proper administration of benefits. Such a 
claim, no matter how couched, is completely preempted and removable on 
that basis.177 
In determining whether a claim “falling between these poles is completely 
preempted . . ., [the Court maintained that] . . . it is necessary to refer to § 502(a).”178  
According to the Court, “Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes 
of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) removable 
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to federal Court.”179  Accordingly, the court concluded that it must examine the 
plaintiff’s claims against U.S. Healthcare to determine whether they could have been 
the subject of a civil enforcement action under § 502(a).180 
In essence, the Third Circuit distinguished its quality-of-care cases in holding 
that a plaintiff’s claim that her HMO delayed approving treatment by an out-of-
network doctor was preempted.181  The Pryzbowski court reaffirmed the principle 
that determinations of whether requested treatment is covered under a policy relate to 
plan administration, and noted that because ERISA provided a remedy for this type 
of complaint, Congress intended that such claims be preempted.182 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
It is widely believed that the U.S. Supreme Court struck a “body blow” against 
the recent flood of lawsuits against managed care organizations in Federal courts.183  
Pegram arose from a rather “garden variety” medical malpractice case in which the 
plaintiff alleged that doctors at her HMO waited too long to order an ultrasound 
when they detected a mass in her abdomen, resulting in a ruptured appendix leading 
to peritonitis.184  But the case had an additional twist.  Pegram also claimed that her 
HMO violated the ERISA requirement, that plan trustees act in her best interests, by 
failing to disclose to her that the HMO paid a year-end bonus to its physicians for 
holding down the number of out-of-plan referrals and diagnostic tests.  Pegram 
argued that this disincentive to refer was the reason her doctor waited so long to 
order her ultrasound.185 
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that ERISA does not require such a 
disclosure and that, therefore, a federal court is not an appropriate forum for such a 
“garden variety” medical malpractice claim.  Justice Souter’s opinion acknowledged 
that for HMOs to survive there must be both rationing of services and an inducement 
to ration.186  The Court rejected the notion that ERISA provides a route for federal 
courts to be drawn into questions of malpractice that are traditionally decided by 
state courts.187  Requiring such disclosures, and imposing liability for failing to make 
them, would mean the end of HMOs.188  The court justified its ruling by noting that 
the system necessarily increased some risks, such as the risk of a ruptured appendix, 
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but reduced other risks, such as the performance of an unnecessary appendectomy.189  
The check on the incentive to provide less service, not more, is the physician’s 
professional obligation to provide covered services with a reasonable degree of skill 
and judgment in the patient’s interest.190 
While Pegram is widely viewed as a resounding victory for the managed care 
industry,191 such victory may prove to be a short-lived one.192  As noted at the outset 
of this article, the Pegram decision has, to some extent, increased the momentum in 
Congress for enactment of a patients’ “bill of rights” legislation.193  Some states, such 
as Texas and Illinois, already allow HMOs to be sued under certain circumstances.194  
However, to what extent Congress and our current President will water down the 
Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001 remains to be seen.195  For now, it is this 
author’s belief that Pegram represents the resounding industry victory it is portrayed 
to be. 
The flip side of Pegram is the Court’s basic holding in the case that doctors do 
not act in a “fiduciary capacity,”196 for ERISA purposes, when they make “mixed 
eligibility” decisions, i.e., decisions about which plan services are appropriate in a 
particular case.197  This means that ERISA is not implicated in the medical judgments 
that managed care physicians make in parceling out healthcare resources.198  Since 
ERISA does not apply to these decisions, HMOs and other providers will no longer 
be able to remove suits based on such decisions to federal court, and argue that 
ERISA’s very limited damages provisions apply to them.199  In that sense, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Pegram may prove to be as much of a victory for 
“patient’s rights” advocates as it is for the managed care industry.200 
Certainly, it is incumbent upon a plaintiff seeking to maintain a state court action 
for malpractice against an HMO to plead very cautiously.  As noted by the Miller 
Court, supra, the complaint “must be parsed very carefully.”201  Ultimately, those 
actions that strictly attack the quality of the health care provided by the HMO, and/or 
address mixed eligibility decisions,202 as opposed to those actions involving purely 
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administrative decisions of the HMO, will remain unmolested by ERISA and 
accordingly will not be preempted by ERISA.203  
In sum, state laws having general application and relating to areas traditionally 
subject to state regulation are more likely to survive preemption challenges.204 
Ultimately, there is still uncertainty as to how far-reaching the Pegram decision 
is with respect to the issue of federal preemption.  In fact, at least one jurist has 
commented: 
I am not . . . certain . . . that the Supreme Court would confine the 
possibility of preemption solely to those cases involving pure eligibility 
determinations, and I believe that the reasoning of Pegram contains at 
least inferential evidence to the contrary.  In my view, Travelers’205 
alteration in the course of ERISA preemption jurisprudence, which was 
emphasized by this Court in Pappas I, may evidence more than the fact of 
a stricter preemption construct.  It may also demonstrate that the 
preemption inquiry may not be presently capable of distillation into 
questions answerable in a simple “yes” and “no” fashion.  Rather, in 
absence of an appropriate legislative solution, the inquiry may have to 
endure a degree of further evolution in the law, perhaps substantial, at 
both the state and federal levels, particularly as it applies to an industry 
which occupies a societal role that touches the citizenry at large and is 
itself rapidly evolving.206 
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